# Circuit Debater – Third Circle – Gun Talk

#### I don’t think this affirmative is particularly good, I think the framework is kinnnnnda garbage. I only read this on the local Nebraska circuit, and I think the contention level is decent, and the framework is…interesting.

## 1AC

### Framework

#### *I value morality because the resolution is a question of an ethical obligation.*

#### Our world is shaped and produced by flows of our desires and drives. These drives are the self-sustaining impetus that guides us towards taking action, and enable us to pursue certain concepts and experiences through desire’s refusal of end-points and movement towards a starting point of openness instead.

John Lundy, 2014

“The Stroll: Reflection on Deleuzian Ethics” Rhizomes Issue 26.

[24] For Deleuze, **the motor of active force**—**the** productive **core of an ethical life**—**is desire**. [[12]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue26/lundy.html" \l "_edn12" \o ") What does this mean? To begin, **Deleuze conceives of existence as a series of material flows, a multiplicity of pure difference in a process of becoming.** In order to exist, societies necessarily structure these natural material flows of life—a process he calls coding. [[13]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue26/lundy.html" \l "_edn13" \o ") Societies enforce rigged restrictions on flows and reproduce fixed ways of doing things. Capitalist societies are unique in that they actually decode flows. Capitalist economic aims, it turns out, are best served by allowing flows to remain fluid and multiplicity to proliferate. Deleuze thinks this decoding is a positive development, however, in the case of capitalism, the catch is that decoding is coupled with axiomatization. In short, although flows remain fluid, they are commodified by the imposed economic law of general equivalence, which means they are emptied of meaning. [[14]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue26/lundy.html" \l "_edn14" \o ") Further, despite the fact that capitalism is a decoding/axiomatization machine, it is ultimately a coding regime, insofar as it is still a society, since it depends on regulating structures like the state and nuclear family. Hence, modern capitalist society leaves the individual in a schizophrenic state where codes are being subverted and desires freed by market forces, while desires continue to be captured and programmed with the values and traditions of coding regimes such as the state, family, church etc. [[15]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue26/lundy.html" \l "_edn15" \o ") [25] For Deleuze, **the repression of desire is the opposite of ethics—it is fascism**. [[16]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue26/lundy.html" \l "_edn16" \o ") According to the more traditional metaphysic, which Deleuze rejects, there are two worlds, material existence and a transcendental realm of value, which submits desire to a system of regulations. Relatedly, **Deleuze would** also agree with Hume, Spinoza, and Nietzsche in **reject**ing **any dualistic distinction between the body/passions/desires on one hand and mind/reason/restraint on the other. For Deleuze there is only material flows, hence, ethics could only be based in the positive and productive force of desire.** Like Marcuse in Eros and Civilization, **Deleuze** **stresses the regressive nature of the** **psychoanalysis tendency to advocate repressing desire**. Yet, Deleuze's break with psychoanalysis is more radical than Marcus' because Deleuze also targets the traditional psychoanalytic definition of desire in terms of lack. **Desire, Deleuze argues, is not governed by a law that sets out its goal in advance; it is not an insatiable need for something. It is not that we are missing something—for instance, pleasure—and desire is our corresponding drive to fill that void. Rather, desire is a free experimentation process on a plane of immanence where anything is permissible**. [[17]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue26/lundy.html" \l "_edn17" \o ") [26] Once we grasp that Deleuze's concept of desire is explained in terms of experimentation, we are in a position to recognize its special affinity with the desire that necessarily guides a stroll. While on a stroll we are free to follow our desire, but that would mean something particular in the context of a stroll, given my characterization of it as animated by a spirit of exploration. **So, if we are sitting at home and feel a need for ice cream and follow our desire straight down to the convenience store, this is clearly not a stroll. It is a structured**, purposive quest to quench a specific lack. The sort of desire that would guide us while on a stroll seems like it would need to be a particularly Deleuzian desire. **On a stroll we're simply out to see what we can find, what unknown we might get up to. Because there are no rigid time constraints, end points, or tasks to accomplish, we are free to express the creative and productive power of our will. It is a sort of experimentation free from any juridical system of regulation. A stroll is a fluid thing in a particularly Deleuzian sense.**

#### We are not beings – we are always becomings - open to the possibility of other ways of living and ethical life through exploring our desires. Only such a conception of desire and social formation gives us the ability to engage in ethical actions and deconstruct unethical conceptions.

John Lundy, 2014

“The Stroll: Reflection on Deleuzian Ethics” Rhizomes Issue 26.

[27] To summarize, **Deleuze thinks the best sort of life is a light and active one that is lived as an exploration of our own bodies, our own desires.** In other words, as I have said, an ethical life is very much like a stroll through life. **It is about affirming becoming, multiplicity, and chance. It is about expanding horizons, through new possibilities and new connections.** It is about finding out what is possible for us, what our minds/bodies can do. It is about being bold in the face of chance and the arbitrary and irregular flows of life. **Instead of forcing ourselves into a particular mold that will shape our life to resemble some prescribed model of "the good life" we need to recognize that this model is a fantasy and that we must rupture the mold in order to find the truly good life that lies beyond it.** [28] Put differently, **the good life** is about becoming what Deleuze calls a "body without organs." [[18]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue26/lundy.html" \l "_edn18" \o ")This doesn't mean that we strive not to have heterogeneous parts (as the phrasing seems to imply). It **means that we eschew hierarchal organizing schemas that define the role of each part in relation to a pre-determinant whole.** In a body, the organs are rhizomatic parts that can connect to any other part. **They come together in different ways to form a moving matrix—an inter-relational assemblage of multiplicity.** **[[19]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue26/lundy.html" \l "_edn19" \o ") The "individual" has no prior or transcendental unity. The individual remains multiple. Once we see ourselves this way, we can begin to free ourselves from the fascist organizing principles that structure and define us and the free flow of our desires.** Only then—not ahead of time, but only through an experimentation or active exploration— can we discover and test the limits of what we can truly do and become. Politically, if we recognize desire as the wellspring of production, and the lifeblood of an ethical life, this would mean that the right societal organization is the one that allows for social productive forces to be subject to no law other than the desires of its members. [29] Here, the points of connection between Deleuze and Marx begin to reveal themselves. Before concluding, I would like to briefly consider these connections for the following reason: On the face of it, the claim that Deleuzian ethics is an ethic of the stroll, appears in danger of oversimplifying or de-radicalizing Deleuze by reducing the stroll to the subjectivist maxim, "Just walk around and do whatever you want." I take this to be a very serious hazard. I will struggle to avoid it by considering how Deleuzian ethics, seen as stroll-like, might be a truly radical position with normative teeth. A related worry is the lack of focus on the political, a blind spot which I will also attempt to correct by way of an inquiry into Deleuze's social and political concerns, and ultimately his connection with Marx.

#### Engagement of the social such as through personal expression of desire is necessary to engage the political and government – the intersections drawn between the two are what forge new possibilities for meaning and allow us to break down existing structures that impose identities upon individuals.

Boris Nikolov, 2008

“CARE OF THE POOR AND ECCLEIASTICAL GOVERNMENT: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF THE SOCIAL SERVICES OF THE COPTIC ORTHODOX CHURCH IN CAIRO, EGYPT.” John Hopkins University.

As **the social domain emerges and carves out its own place, it reconfigures the other domains of action creating hybrid forms or entirely new configurations.** Deleuze stresses that **the social "sector" doesn't merge with the juridical, economic, public and private ones, but produces new divisions and relationships to form a space for a new type of interventions** - the interventions of government (Deleuze 1979, p. x) or in other words, **the space for government through care which cannot be reduced to any other social domain. It is especially important to note that the emergence of the social as described in Donzelot's genealogy, has a dynamic of its own which consists in the transformation of the existing, relatively settled domains of action into domains with "social aspects" that could not exist before. The social is "floating", it cannot be reduced to other configurations, it destabilizes them, challenges them by creating new lines of separation,** in other words, **the social is reproduced in the constant engagement with other domains**, or, as Deleuze puts it, "older apparatuses" **which are reconfigured to create new conditions of living** and lines of division (Deleuze 1979, p. xi). The importance of Deleuze's observation is **1) that the social creates new possibilities for action, and 2) that these possibilities/conditions exist at the intersections between different domains. The transformation of existing domains is also a transformation of the understanding and practice of care. Seen as internal to political economy, and therefore not belonging to any other field such as politics, poverty cannot be an object of government because it is not conceptualized with the purpose of intervening to bridge the gap between the economy and something else. Dealing with poverty in that sense doesn't require the creation of a new social space where economic and political rationalities can coexist and articulate one another. To be made governable, poverty has to be conceptualized as both internal and external to the economy, as part of a social, rather than natural, space that doesn't overlap fully with the economy and has therefore a degree of autonomy.**

#### Therefore, the standard is consistency with productive modes of desire.

### Contention 1 is Gun Talk

#### Society has casted a personification of power, mystery, and passion upon the handgun, intoxicating youth with a seductive image of guns as adrenaline filled objects of exhilaration.

Bernard E. Harcourt, 1

“Language of the Gun – Youth, Crime, and Public Policy” 2006, pg 94-95

The interviews reflect how deeply seductive guns are to the youths at Catalina. To many, they are sensual objects. They have a sleek feel. A kick. They bring together metal, power, oil, and thrust. Let’s start here, then, with the sensuality of guns. “I like big guns,” a seventeen-year-old gangbanger explains, “but I don’t like carrying them with me. When I do carry a gun I want to carry, like, a goodsized one. The Ruge**r** ain’t even that big, it’s, like, fat, about sixteen bullets, big bullets, and that would blow a hole through your chest” (CMS-10, 20). “I like to reload bullet shells,” another youth tells me (CMS-46, 17). Another likes the way guns work. The gunpowder. “It’s just, it’s just weird. I don’t know how to describe them. They’re just, they’re really, I think they’re just . . . the way they make them, make them work, work on them, and how the powder in it actually works, you know” (CMS-40, 13). Guns hold a surprisingly powerful and passionate grip over these youths regardless of which cluster they find themselves in. The intensity of the attraction, in some cases, is hard to communicate in words. **One seventeen-year-old Anglo youth explains: “When you go to shoot a gun, you get butterflies in your stomach. You get nervous unless you do it quick. Like on stand-offs, when stand-offs happen. No one is gonna shoot until, the longer they wait, the more butterflies they get in the stomach. The more worried they get. They feel like vomiting. They think, ‘Oh, God. I’m getting weak. I can’t do this.’ If you talk to them awhile, they get worried and they can’t pull the trigger”** (CMS-8, 32–33). **Gun violence can be exhilarating**. Here are a few stories recounted by **a seventeen-year-old gang member** (CMS-10, 32). He’s Mexican—“Pure Mexican; I’m straight Mexican, that’s all I am”—and he **moved to Tucson from Los Angeles. You can feel the excitement, you can hear the thrill in** his **stories**: In LA . . . some guys came by and they just drove by, a drive-by, started shooting at us . . . Rivals, I don’t know, didn’t see them. **We got in the car and chased them** . . . **They were using a Mac-10, somebody had a handgun, but I couldn’t see what kind it was. It was small like a .25. We got in the car and started chasing them. There were about five people in their car. Three or four [in ours]. We got in, started chasing them. For a while we were chasing them, and finally they just ended up going to a dead end. When they got off, they started running and shooting at us, and we just started unloading.** After we got them we just left . . . We seen blood and left . . . We went back to my house where we were at, just tell my boys. Later on, about 12:00, we went back to see what happened. There were still cops and all kinds of things. (CMS-10, 22–23) One time, we were at a park and I had a gun on me, in my pocket. Some guys came tripping, talking shit and then my boys were, like, “What the fuck.” They started going and talking. Then I had a gun on me. They started talking. I told them, “What’s your problem? What you want?” My boys said, “Nah, stay out of this” and all. I said “Fuck that.” Then he goes, “What you want, problems too?” I said, “Whatever, you call it, what you want?” Then he took off his shirt, so I took off my shirt. I gave my gun to my friend, and they seen it and they just backed up. I said, “I ain’t gonna use it, come on,” and we just got in a fight . . . At first he didn’t want to fight me because of the gun. But then I gave it to my friend, and he was, like, he didn’t want to fight me. But after I hit him, he had no choice but to fight. (CMS-10, 24) CMS-10 **lives at the limit, at the very edge of life. And to him it is exhilarating. Deeply sensual—bloody, hot, passionate. Scary. Threatening. Defining. Guns have a grip on these youths.**

#### And, this seductive culture of handguns forms ethical warfare by creating a warrior ethos that frames the handgun as the impetus to fight a righteous battle against an immoral enemy labeled deviant. This moves violence from a material happening to a moral imperative to destroy the enemy as a form of passionate punishment to rectify supposed injustices.

Bernard E. Harcourt, 2

“Language of the Gun – Youth, Crime, and Public Policy” 2006, pg 96-98

In other cases youths invoke notions of “enemies” and moral conceptions of “warfare.” Guns, for them, are about getting back, seeking revenge in gang rivalries. A sixteen-year-old Yaqui gang member explains: “I know when I have my gun, that’s when I’m going after people. I’m not doing it to defend myself. I’m doing it because I want to kill somebody else. I want to shoot somebody else” (CMS-65, 19). For these youths, guns are all about “shooting at my enemy” (CMS-10, 5). The notion of “enemy” carries enormous moral weight. Guns are a way of evening a deadly score. “By killing somebody,” one gang member tells me, “you can earn a lot of respect. Cause a lot of my homeys died, and if the homeys see somebody get killed, be like something to get that for. Go to the funeral, tell them I’m gonna get them for you. Get them, that’s for my homey, man” (CMS-10, 36). Other notions of moral entitlement permeate the interviews. One youth, a fifteen-year-old African American gang member, feels morally entitled to guns simply because they are made. If they weren’t supposed to be used, he protests, they shouldn’t be produced. “Certain guns I think are for protection and they’re just tight to have. Just tight for you to have one of those guns for yourself,” he states. “It’s good to have one. There’s no problem with having one coming from me . . . Because you should be able to know what you want. And if it’s a problem to have one, then they shouldn’t be made. People do make it a problem to have them, but they still make them” (CMS-13, 6). This same youth also expressed a sense of entitlement to guns because the police are armed. “Some people carry guns just because the police do. Some people carry guns because police shoot at people. They think they have the right to shoot back. They do, I think, have reason to protect themselves. They gonna protect their self by saying you can’t protect your own? Don’t make no sense. Shouldn’t go that way” (CMS-13, 26). Guns and gun carrying, in this sense, have their own attraction beyond their merely instrumental value. Like other criminal objects and behavior, they are more than just a means to achieve material benefit. They may express moral judgment, moral condemnation, or self-righteousness. In his brilliant essay “Crime as Social Control,” Donald Black emphasizes that “much crime is moralistic and involves the pursuit of justice. It is a mode of conflict management, possibly a form of punishment, even capital punishment. Viewed in relation to law, it is self-help” (1983, 34). Most homicides, Black argues, are themselves reactions to conduct that the perpetrator perceives as deviant—whether during a fight, in self-defense, or because of provocation such as adultery, disloyalty, or affronts to honor. Similarly, most conduct classified as assault, and many acts classified as burglaries, thefts, and robberies, can also be understood as punishment or as an expression of a grievance. “In New York City,” Black writes, “where over one-third of the people arrested for robbery are acquainted with their victims, the crime often arises from a quarrel over money” (1983, 37). Vandalism is also often a form of social control and may result from the victim’s violating local norms or calling the police to intervene in social conflicts. Other crimes as well, including sexual assault, may often have moral elements. Black quotes a passage from Eldridge Cleaver’s 1968 Soul on Ice, where Cleaver described his selection of white women victims: “It delighted me that I was defying and trampling upon the white man’s law, upon his system of values, and that I was defiling his women—and this point, I believe, was the most satisfying to me because I was very resentful over the historical fact of how the white man has used the black woman. I felt I was getting revenge” (Black 1983, 38, quoting Cleaver). These offenses, Black observes, are “intended as a punishment or other expression of disapproval, whether applied reflectively or impulsively, with coolness or in the heat of passion. Some [are] an effort to achieve compensation, or restitution, for a harm that has been done” (1983, 35–36). Jack Katz, in his seminal Seductions of Crime, similarly highlights the moral and sensual dimensions of crime that are reflected in the Catalina interviews. As Katz emphasizes, there are “positive, often wonderful attractions within the lived experience of criminality” (1988, 3). These sensual dimensions are too often sublimated in academic research. “The social science literature contains only scattered evidence of what it means, feels, sounds, tastes, or looks like to commit a particular crime,” Katz notes. “Readers of research on homicide and assault do not hear the slaps and curses, see the pushes and shoves, or feel the humiliation and rage that may build toward the attack, sometimes persisting after the victim’s death” (1988, 3). But **when we begin to experience crime from the criminal’s perspective, we often see its rich and seductive dimensions. “Central to all these experiences in deviance is a member of the family of moral emotions: humiliation, righteousness, arrogance, ridicule, cynicism, defilement, and vengeance”** (9). **The crime most often does not emerge from a material gap**. It is not motivated by the need to get a television set or some cash. **It arises from the need to resolve moral tension**. The closer one looks at crime, at least at the varieties examined here, the more vividly relevant become the moral emotions. **Follow vandals and amateur shoplifters as they duck into alleys and dressing rooms and you will be moved by their delight in deviance**; observe them under arrest and you may be stunned by their shame. **Watch their strutting street display and you will be struck by the awesome fascination that symbols of evil hold for the young men who are linked in the groups we often call gangs. If we specify the opening moves in muggings and stickups, we describe an array of “games” or tricks that turn victims into fools before their pockets are turned out.** The careers of persistent robbers show us, not the increasingly precise calculations and hedged risks of “professionals,” but men for whom gambling and other vices are a way of life, who are “wise” in the cynical sense of the term, and take pride in a defiant reputation as “bad.” And **if we examine the lived sensuality behind events of cold-blooded “senseless” murder, we are compelled to acknowledge the power that may still be created in the modern world through the sensualities of defilement, spiritual chaos, and the apprehension of vengeance.** (Katz 1988, 312) **The key to interpreting youths’ gun carrying**, then, **may be** precisely **to explore**, rather than ignore, **what it feels like to carry a gun, what it means to pack heat, what gunpowder smells like, the kick of the gun, the appeal of those two baby nines. We may need to listen closely and carefully to the voices of the youths themselves.**

#### The signifier of the gun talk that forms America’s violent gun culture is “being strapped”, “packing heat”, “holding”, “holstering a piece” – carrying a gun. This makes the banning of handguns that is the removal of the signifier of the handgun from the possibility of being acquired and actively held by youth the most effective method to deconstruct gun culture. Our banning of handguns should start from a point of social science that is an action of social ethics rather than of politics, allowing an open-ended multi-faceted relationship to breaking down social signifiers.

Bernard E. Harcourt, 3

“Language of the Gun – Youth, Crime, and Public Policy” 2006

**The robust connection between the registers of gun talk and the contexts of gun carrying and gang membership suggests that instead of thinking about these Catalina youths through the lens of traditional categories of race or class or juvenile records**, it may make sense to think about them through the lens of the symbolic meanings. **There is a clear association between the registers of gun talk and carrying status**. The action/protection cluster of meanings—**the symbolic realm of protection, danger, attraction, power, jail, action, belonging, and death—is most closely associated with extensive carrying**. The other clusters of meaning—recreation/respect and commodity/dislike—are more closely associated with low or no carrying. In trying to understand these Catalina youths, it may make sense to think through these clusters of meaning. This could translate, at the policy level, into taking several approaches to target the different Catalina youths. The correspondence maps reveal that **nongang youths associate guns more with exchange value (the commodity cluster), and that gang members associate them more with use value** (the action/protection cluster). This might suggest that **nongang youths may be more likely to relate to the exchange value of guns in an economic sense and therefore may be more likely to respond to traditional rational choice approaches. In contrast,** gang members may be relatively immune to rational choice approaches and may need different appeals, such as practice-based alternatives (orienting them to alternative practices that encourage belonging and other sorts of meaningful action). Since the first set of youths are far less likely to be carrying guns, it may be a waste of resources to target recreational uses of guns or even commodity exchanges (selling, buying, and trading). It may be wiser to confiscate guns from youths who are selling or playing with them, rather than to prosecute them. **As for the second set of youths—those who are more closely associated with the action/protection cluster—rational choice approaches are unlikely to succeed. For these youths, the risks of death associated with guns may far outweigh the cost of incarceration. When we add to this the deep sensual and moral attraction to guns, it becomes clear that adjudicative responses are unlikely to succeed. Instead, it may be more productive to find substitutes for guns and to reduce, as much as possible, the availability of guns among youths**.29 If we listen closely to the Catalina youths, we may also acquire different vantage points on the policy of incarcerating youths for gun violations. Some of the youths sound deterred by the threat of jail time, but others seem to ignore the risk. On one hand, the correspondence maps suggest that guns are far more attractive to youths who have not been charged and detained on a gun charge. Youths who have never been incarcerated on gun charges are also more likely to view guns as offering a sense of belonging. In addition, incarceration on a gun charge seems to accentuate the danger associated with guns—not just the risk of getting caught and sent to prison (the jail meaning), but also the risk of harming yourself or others (the danger meaning itself). To be sure, the causal arrows are not entirely clear; but these factors suggest that incarceration may have a chilling effect on the attraction of guns. On the other hand, a number of other signals caution against the use of incarceration. What remains constant and robust in the correspondence maps is the close association between gun carrying, gang membership, and the need for protection in an aggressive, preemptive way. Incarceration does not alter the centrality of the protection meaning among gun-carrying youths. In other words, the policy of gun detention does not seem to shake loose the protection meaning—the one meaning with the greatest frequency of gun carrying. The central symbol of gun carrying and gang membership is simply not affected by the policy of incarcerating youths who carry guns. In addition, again based on the correspondence maps, **youth incarceration seems to increase the danger associated with guns, in turn accentuating the need for guns to gain protection from other youths, to exercise control, or to inflict or avoid death. That is, incarceration underscores how dangerous the world is and how necessary guns are and in this way may reinforce the central symbolic meaning of guns— aggressive protection. The centrality of action/protection to gun carrying, to gang membership, and also to the youths who are incarcerated on gun infractions suggests the need to target the idea that guns afford protection**. This may translate into a number of policies, including a focus on youth conflict resolution, parental and school supervision, safety monitoring in schools and public areas, architectural redesign of schools, practice-based alternatives, and counseling. **It may also mean finding ways to help the Catalina youths discover how to express an identity that does not center on aggressive self-protection or involve lifethreatening weapons—alternative ways for these youths to achieve respect for themselves and to create their own identity.** This may be labor intensive. It may mean rethinking how to intellectually stimulate the Catalina youths. It may entail creating job training and valuable job opportunities. It may mean redesigning our educational system. **Regardless of the specific intervention, though, the idea would be to target, by every means possible, the felt need for protection that action/protection youths associate with guns: to engage in a concerted effort to confiscate guns through consensual search policies and supervision; to implement practicebased alternatives to gun carrying; to make youths’ environments feel safer.** And to investigate every means possible to reduce youths’ access to guns**.**

That, in turn, may entail a combination of legal strategies, including holding gun owners legally accountable for their guns, requiring safe storage of guns in homes and automobiles, **confiscating guns from youths through policies like the St. Louis police department’s “consent to search and seize” program** (Rosenfeld and Decker 1996), and otherwise continually targeting gun sources as they emerge (see, e.g., Ash et al. 1996, 1758; Sherman et al. 1998). It might even include a system of annual inspection and registration of guns modeled on automobile regulation. All in all, **it is essential from a policy perspective to treat guns for what they are to the most susceptible youths: seductively dangerous. The multiplicity of meanings, resistance, and contexts** in a setting like the Catalina Mountain School in Tucson, Arizona, **suggests that there is no quick fix, no silver bullet for youths’ gun possession. There is no single meaning that we could reengineer to change these youths’ behaviors. There is no one perception that we could leverage to alter their gun carrying. From a policy perspective, we need to develop an eclectic approach that is tailored to the different meanings, contexts, and preferences—especially the action/protection cluster.** Given that guns are so seductive to these adjudicated youths and that so many of them feel a compelling need to arm themselves for protection, the emphasis will have to be on developing local interventions specifically tailored to their local meaning structures. I emphasize here local meaning structures. The registers of gun talk from these Catalina interviews reflect only local meanings—meanings particular to the Catalina school, embedded as it is in the Southwest and so close to the Mexican border.30 “Do you think you can govern innocently?” Hoederer asks. In the field of law and public policy, many turn to the social sciences in order to answer yes. Yes, **we can model behavior and choose outcomes that offer the greatest benefit to the most people.** Here I throw in my lot with Michael Walzer: “My own answer is no, I don’t think I could govern innocently. But this does not mean that it isn’t possible to do the right thing while governing” (1973, 161). **In the end, the choice of a methodological approach in social science research is not dictated by science, and the implications we draw for our laws and public policies are not entirely scientific. When we adopt a social science method, we make a decision about the way in which we are going to shape the human subject. And in the process, we dirty our hands. We have made an ethical choice.**